Pursuit-Evasion Games with Incomplete Information in Discrete Time by Gurel-Gurevich, Ori
ar
X
iv
:0
70
8.
25
56
v1
  [
ma
th.
PR
]  
19
 A
ug
 20
07
Pursuit-Evasion Games with Incomplete
Information in Discrete Time
Ori Gurel-Gurevich ∗
October 25, 2018
Abstract
Pursuit-Evasion Games (in discrete time) are stochastic games
with nonnegative daily payoffs, with the final payoff being the cu-
mulative sum of payoffs during the game. We show that such games
admit a value even in the presence of incomplete information and that
this value is uniform, i.e. there are ǫ-optimal strategies for both play-
ers that are ǫ-optimal in any long enough prefix of the game. We give
an example to demonstrate that nonnegativity is essential and expand
the results to Leavable Games.
Key words: pursuit-evasion games, incomplete information, zero-sum
stochastic games, recursive games, nonnegative payoffs.
1 Introduction
Games of Pursuit and Evasion are two-player zero-sum games involving a
Pursuer (P) and an Evader (E). P’s goal is to capture E, and the game
consist of the space of possible locations and the allowed motions for P and
E. These games are usually encountered within the domain of differential
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games, i.e., the location space and the allowed motions have the cardinality
of the continuum and they tend to be of differentiable or at least continuous
nature.
The subject of Differential Games in general, and Pursuit-Evasion Games
in particular, was pioneered in the 50s by Isaacs (1965). These games evolved
from the need to solve military problems such as airfights, as opposed to clas-
sical game theory which was oriented toward solving economical problems.
The basic approach was akin to differential equations techniques and op-
timal control, rather than standard game theoretic tools. The underlying
assumption was that of complete information, and optimal pure strategies
were searched for. Conditions were given, under which a pure strategies
saddle point exists (see, for example, Varaiya and Lin (1969)). Usually the
solution was given together with a value function, which assigned each state
of the game its value. Complete information was an essential requirement in
this case. For a thorough introduction to Pursuit-Evasion and Differential
Games see Basar and Olsder (1999).
A complete-information continuous-time game “intuitively” shares some
relevant features with perfect-information discrete-time games. The latter
are games with complete knowledge of past actions and without simultane-
ous actions. Indeed, if one player decides to randomly choose between two
pure strategies which differ from time t0 and on, his opponent will discover
this “immediately” after t0, thus enabling himself to respond optimally al-
most instantly. Assuming the payoff is continuous, the small amount of time
needed to discover the strategy chosen by the opponent should affect the
payoff negligibly. A well-known result of Martin (1975, 1985) implies that
every perfect-information discrete-time game has ǫ-optimal pure strategies
(assuming a Borel payoff function) and so should, in a sense, continuous
time games.
Another reason to restrict oneself to pure strategies is that unlike discrete-
time games, there is no good formal framework for continuous-time games.
By framework we mean a way to properly define the space of pure strategies
and the measurable σ-algebra on them. There are some approaches but none
is as general or complete as for discrete-time games. This kind of framework
is essential when dealing with a general incomplete information setting.
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This paper will therefore deal with discrete-time Pursuit-Evasion Games.
We hope that our result will be applied in the future to discrete approxima-
tions of continuous-time games. Pursuit-Evasion Games in discrete time are
formalized and discussed in Kumar and Shiau (1981).
Pursuit-Evasion Games are generally divided into two categories: Games
of Kind and Games of Degree. Games of Kind deal with the question of
capturability : whether a capture can be achieved by the Pursuer or not.
In a complete-information setting this is a yes-or-no question, completely
decided by the rules of the game and the starting positions. With incomplete
information incorporated, we simply assign a payoff of 1 for the event of
capture and payoff 0 otherwise. Games of Degree have the Pursuer try to
minimize a certain payoff function such as the time needed for capture. The
question of capturability is encountered here only indirectly: if the Evader
have a chance of escaping capture indefinitely, the expected time of capture
is infinity. The payoff, in general, can be any function, such as the minimal
distance between the Evader and some target set.
What unites the two categories is that the payoff function in both is
positive and cumulative. The maximizing player, be it the Pursuer or the
Evader, gains his payoff and never loses anything. This is in contrast with
other classes of infinitely repeated games, such as undiscounted stochastic
games, where the payoff is the limit of the averages of daily payoffs.
Discrete-time stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953) who
proved the existence of the discounted value in two-player zero-sum games
with finite state and action sets. Recursive games were introduced by Everett
(1957). These are stochastic games, in which the payoff is 0 except for
absorbing states, when the game terminates. Thus, absorbing states are as
happens in Pursuit-Evasion Games, where the payoff is obtained only when
the game terminates. The game is said to have a uniform value if ǫ-optimal
strategies exist that are also ǫ-optimal in any long enough prefix of the game.
Everett proved the existence of the uniform value for two-player, zero-sum
recursive games.
We shall now formally define Pursuit-Evasion Games to be two-player
zero-sum games with cumulative and positive payoffs. To avoid confusion, the
players will be called the Maximizer and the Minimizer, and their respective
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goals should be obvious.
Our main result is the existence of uniform value for Pursuit-Evasion
Games with incomplete-information and finite action and signal sets, fol-
lowed by a generalization for arbitrary signal sets. In section 4 we present a
different class of games to which our proof also applies. In section 5 we show
that the positiveness requirement is indispensable by giving an appropriate
counterexample.
2 Definitions and the main Theorem
A cumulative game with complete information is given by:
• Two finite sets A1 and A2 of actions.
Define Hn = (A
1 × A2)n to be the set of all histories of length n, and
H = ∪∞n=0Hn to be the set of all finite histories.
• A daily payoff function f : H → R.
Let H˜ = (A1 × A2)ℵ0 be the set of all infinite histories. The daily payoff
function induces a payoff function ρ : H˜ → R by ρ(h) =
∑∞
n=0 f(hn), where
hn is the length n prefix of h. In the sequel we will only study the case in
which f is nonnegative, so that ρ is well defined (though it may be infinite).
The game is played in stages as follows. The initial history is h0 = ∅.
At each stage n ≥ 0 both players choose simultaneously and independently
actions a ∈ A and b ∈ B, and each player is informed of the other’s choice.
The new game history is hn+1 = hn ⌢< a, b >, i.e., the concatenation of
< a, b > to the current history. The infinite history of the game, h, is the
concatenation of all pairs of actions chosen throughout the game. The payoff
is ρ(h), the goal of the Maximizer is to maximize the expectation of ρ(h),
and that of the Minimizer is to minimize it.
If all the values of f are nonnegative, we call the game nonnegative.
A complete information Pursuit-Evasion Game is a nonnegative cumulative
game.
As cumulative games are a proper superset of recursive games (see Ev-
erett (1957)), Pursuit-Evasion Games are a proper superset of nonnegative
recursive games.
4
As is standard in game theory, the term “complete information” is used
to denote a game with complete knowledge of the history of the game, and
not the lack of simultaneous actions (which is termed “perfect information”).
A cumulative game with incomplete information is given by:
• Two finite sets A1 and A2 of actions.
Define Hn and H as before.
• A daily payoff function f : H → R.
• Two measure spaces S1 and S2 of signals.
• ∀h ∈ H two probability distributions p1h ∈ ∆(S
1) and p2h ∈ ∆(S
2).
Define H˜ and ρ as before. In particular, the signals are not a parameter
of the payoff function.
An incomplete-information cumulative game is played like a complete
information cumulative game, except that the players are not informed of
each other’s actions. Instead, a signal pair < s1, s2 >∈ S1 × S2 is randomly
chosen with distribution p1h×p
2
h, h being the current history of the game, with
player i observing si. An incomplete-information Pursuit-Evasion Game is
an incomplete-information nonnegative cumulative game.
Define H in to be (A
i × Si)n. This is the set of private histories of length
n of player i. Similarly, define H i = ∪∞n=0H
i
n, the set of all private finite
histories, and H˜ i = (Ai × Si)ℵ0 the set of all private infinite histories.
In a complete-information cumulative game a behavioral strategy for
player i is a function σi : H → ∆(Ai). In an incomplete-information cumula-
tive game a (behavioral) strategy for player i is a function σi : H i → ∆(Ai).
Recall that by Kuhn’s Theorem (Kuhn (1953)) the set of all behavioral strate-
gies coincides with the set of all mixed strategies, which are probability dis-
tributions over pure strategies.
Denote the space of all behavioral strategies for player i by Ωi. A profile
is a pair of strategies, one for each player. A profile < σ1, σ2 >, together
with {pih}, induces, in the obvious manner, a probability measure µσ1,σ2 over
H˜ equipped with the product σ-algebra.
The value of a strategy σ1 for the Maximizer is val(σ1) = infσ2∈Ω2 Eµ
σ1,σ2
(ρ(h)).
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The value of a strategy σ2 for the Minimizer is val(σ2) = supσ1∈Ω1 Eµσ1,σ2 (ρ(h)).
When several games are discussed we will explicitly denote the value in
game G by valG.
The lower value of the game is val(G) = supσ1∈Ω1 val(σ
1).
The upper value of the game is val(G) = infσ2∈Ω2 val(σ
2).
If val(G) = val(G), the common value is the value of the game val(G) =
val(G) = val(G). Observe that val(G) and val(G) always exist, and that
val(G) ≤ val(G) always holds.
A strategy σi of player i is ǫ-optimal if |val(σi)− val(G)| < ǫ. A strategy
is optimal if it is 0-optimal.
A cumulative game is bounded if its payoff function ρ is bounded, i.e.
∃B ∈ R∀h ∈ H˜ − B < ρ(h) < B.
Let G =< A1, A2, f > be a cumulative game. Define fn to be equal to
f for all histories of length up to n and zero for all other histories. Define
Gn =< A
1, A2, fn >. Thus, Gn is the restriction of G to the first n stages.
Let ρn be the payoff function induced by fn.
A game G is said to have a uniform value if it has a value and for each
ǫ > 0 there exist N and two strategies σ1, σ2 for the two players that are
ǫ-optimal for every game Gn with n > N .
The first main result is:
Theorem 1 Every bounded Pursuit-Evasion Game with incomplete-information
and finite signal sets has a uniform value. Furthermore, an optimal strategy
exists for the Minimizer.
Proof. Let G be a bounded Pursuit-Evasion Game with incomplete-
information . Let Gn be defined as above. Since A
1, A2, S1, S2 are all finite,
there are only a finite number of private histories of length up to n. Gn is
equivalent to a finite-stage finite-action game, and therefore it has a value
vn. From the definition of Gn and since f is nonnegative
∀h ∈ H˜ ρn(h) ≤ ρn+1(h) ≤ ρ(h)
which implies that for all σ1 ∈ Ω1
valGn(σ
1) ≤ valGn+1(σ
1) ≤ valG(σ
1) (1)
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so that
val(Gn) ≤ val(Gn+1) ≤ val(G).
Therefore, vn is a nondecreasing bounded sequence and val(G) is at least
v = limn→∞ vn.
On the other hand, define Kn = {σ
2 ∈ Ω2 | valGn(σ
2) ≤ v}. Since
val(Gn) = vn ≤ v, Kn cannot be empty.
Kn is a compact set, since the function valGn(σ
2) is continuous over Ω2,
which is compact, and Kn is the preimage of the closed set (−∞, v].
For all σ2 ∈ Ω2 valGn(σ
2) ≤ valGn+1(σ
2), so that Kn ⊇ Kn+1. Since the
sets Kn are compact, their intersection is nonempty.
Let σ2 be a strategy for the Minimizer in ∩∞n=0Kn. Let σ
1 be any strategy
for the Maximizer. From ρ(h) = limn→∞ ρn(h) and since ρ is bounded, we
get by the monotone convergence Theorem
Eµ
σ1,σ2
(ρ(h)) = lim
n→∞
Eµ
σ1,σ2
(ρn(h)).
Since σ2 belongs to Kn, Eµ
σ1,σ2
(ρn(h)) ≤ v and therefore Eµ
σ1,σ2
(ρ(h)) ≤ v.
Since σ1 is arbitrary val(σ2) ≤ v, so that val(G) ≤ v. Consequentially, v is
the value of G.
Notice that any σ2 ∈ ∩∞n=0Kn has valG(σ
2) = v and is therefore an
optimal strategy for the Minimizer.
Given ǫ > 0 choose N such that vN > v−ǫ. Let σ
1 be an optimal strategy
for the Maximizer in GN , and let σ
2 ∈ ∩∞n=0Kn. By (1)
∀n > N vn − ǫ ≤ v − ǫ < vN = valGN (σ
1) ≤ valGn(σ
1)
so that σ1 is ǫ-optimal in Gn. As σ
2 ∈ Kn one has valGn(σ
2) ≤ v < vn+ ǫ so
that σ2 is ǫ-optimal in Gn.
These strategies are ǫ-optimal in all games Gn for n > N . Thus, the value
is uniform.
Remark: Most of the assumption on the game G are irrelevant for the
proof of the theorem and were given only for the simplicity of description.
1. The action sets Ai and the signal sets Si may depend respectively on
the private histories H in.
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2. The signals < s1, s2 > may be correlated, i.e. chosen from a common
distribution ph ∈ ∆(S
1 × S2).
3. The game can be made stochastic simply by adding a third player, Na-
ture, with a known behavioral strategy. The action set for Nature can
be countable, since it could always be approximated by large enough
finite sets. The action sets for the Maximizer can be infinite as long as
the signals set S2 is still finite (so the number of pure strategies for the
Minimizer in Gn is still finite).
4. Since the bound on payoffs was only used to bound the values of Gn,
one can drop the boundedness assumption, as long as the sequence {vn}
is bounded. If they are unbounded then G has infinite uniform value in
the sense that the Maximizer can achieve as high a payoff as he desires.
3 Arbitrary signal sets
Obviously, the result still hold if we replace the signal set S by a sequence
of signal sets Sn, all of which are finite, such that the signals for histories
of length n belong to Sn. The signal sets, like the action sets can change
according to past actions, but since there are only finitely many possible
histories of length n, this is purely semantical.
What about signals chosen from an infinite set? If the set S is countable
than we can approximate it with finite sets Sn, chosen such that for any
history h of length n the chance we get a signal outside Sn is negligible.
We won’t go into details because the next argument applies for both the
countable and the uncountable cases.
A cumulative game G is ǫ-approximated by a game G′ if G′ has the same
strategy spaces as G and for any pair of strategies σ, τ
|ρG(σ, τ)− ρG′(σ, τ)| < ǫ.
Lemma 2 If G is a bounded Pursuit-Evasion Game with incomplete infor-
mation then G can be ǫ-approximated by a Pursuit Evasion Game with in-
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complete information with the same action sets and payoffs which can be
simulated using a sequence of finite signal sets.
Proof. LetG be such a game. Assume, w.l.o.g., that the payoff function ρ
is bounded by 1. Fix a positive ǫ. Let ǫn = ǫ/2
n. Define pin =
∑
h∈Hn
pih/|Hn|,
the mean distribution of the signals at stage n. Every distribution pih of time
n is absolutely continuous with respect to pin. By Radon-Nykodim theorem,
a density function f ih exists such that p
i
h(E) =
∫
E
f ihdp
i
n. Clearly, f
i
h is
essentially bounded by |Hn|.
Let S ′in be {0, ǫn, 2ǫn, 3ǫn, ..., ⌊|Hn|/ǫn⌋ǫn}
|Hn|. For h ∈ Hn define f
′i
h to
be f ih rounded down to the nearest multiple of ǫn. Define F
′i
n : S
i → S ′in by
F ′in (s) = {f
′i
h (s)}h∈Hn. Let G
′ be the same game as G except that the players
observe the signals F ′in (s
i) ∈ S ′in where s
i is the original signal with density
f ih.
Given a signal s′i in S ′in one can project it back onto S
i by choosing
from a uniform distribution (with respect to the measure pin) over the set
E(s′i) = F ′in
−1
(s′i). Let G′′ be the game G except that the signals are chosen
with the distribution just described. Denote their density function by f ′′ih .
This game can be simulated using only the signals in G′ and vice versa so
they are equivalent.
G and G′′ have exactly the same strategy spaces. The only difference is
a different distribution of the signals. But the way the signals in G′′ were
constructed it is obvious that the density function f ′′ih do not differ from f
i
h
by more than ǫn for any history h of length n. Given a profile < σ
1, σ2 >
denote the generated distributions on H˜ in G and G′′ by µ and µ′′. The
payoffs are ρG(σ
1, σ2) =
∫
ρdµ and ρG′′(σ
1, σ2) =
∫
ρdµ′′ . But the distance,
in total variation metric, between µ and µ′′ cannot be more than the sum
of distances between the distributions of signals at each stage, which is no
more than
∑∞
i=1 ǫi = ǫ. By definition of total variation metric, the difference
between
∫
ρdµ and
∫
ρdµ′′ cannot be more than ǫ.
Theorem 3 If G is as in lemma and have bounded nonnegative payoffs, it
has a uniform value.
Proof. Let G be such a game, and for any ǫ let Gǫ be an ǫ-approximation
of G produced by the lemma. Gǫ is equivalent to a game with finite signal
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sets and therefore has a value according to Theorem 1, denoted vǫ. It is
immediate from the definition of ǫ-approximation that v, the lower value of
G cannot be less than vǫ − ǫ, and likewise v is no more than vǫ + ǫ. v − v is
therefore less than 2ǫ. But ǫ was chosen arbitrarily, so that v = v.
Given ǫ > 0 let σ1 and σ2 be ǫ/2-optimal strategies in Gǫ/2 that are also
ǫ/2-optimal in any prefix of Gǫ/2 longer than N . Clearly, these strategies are
ǫ-optimal in any Gn with n > N . Thus, the value is uniform.
4 Leavable games
Leavable games are cumulative games in which one of the players, say the
Maximizer, but not his opponent is allowed to leave the game at any stage.
The obvious way to model this class of games would be to add a “stopping”
stage between any two original stages, where the Maximizer will choose to
either “stop” or “continue” the game. However, we would also like to force
the Maximizer to “stop” at some stage. Unfortunately, it is impossible to do
so and still remain within the realm of cumulative games, so we will have to
deal with it a bit differently.
Leavable games were introduced by Maitra and Sudderth (1992) as an
extension to similar concepts in the theory of gambling. They proved that a
leavable game with complete information and finite action sets has a value.
We will prove that the same is true for leavable games with incomplete in-
formation.
Let G be a cumulative game with incomplete information. A stop rule for
player i is a function s : H˜ i → N such that if s(h) = n and h′ coincides with
h in the first n coordinates, then s(h′) = n. A leavable game with incomplete
information L(G) is given by a cumulative game with incomplete information
G but is play differently, as follows. Instead of playing in stages, both players
choose their behavioral strategies simultaneously with the Maximizer also
choosing a stop rule s. The game is played according to these strategies and
the payoff is ρ(h1) =
∑s(h1)
i=0 f(hn) where h
1 is the Maximizer’s private infinite
history.
Theorem 4 A bounded leavable game with incomplete information and finite
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signal sets has a value and that value is uniform. Furthermore, an optimal
strategy exists for the Minimizer.
Proof. The proof is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 1. Ln is
Defined to be the game where the Maximizer is forced to choose a stop rule
≤ n. Ln is thus equivalent to Gn in the proof of Theorem 1.
The major point we should observe is that if A1 and S1 are finite, any
stop rule s : H˜1 → N is uniformly bounded: ∃B∀h ∈ H˜1 s(h) < B. This
implies that any pure strategy for the Maximizer in L actually belongs to
some Ln. Therefore, a strategy σ
2 for the Minimizer with valLn(σ
2) ≤ v for
all n, has valL(σ
2) ≤ v.
5 Counterexamples
The question arises whether positiveness is an essential or just a technical
requirement. Both our proof and the alternative proof outlined need the
positiveness in an essential way, but still is it possible that every cumulative
game have a value?
The answer is Negative. We shall provide a simple counterexample of a
cumulative game (actually a stopping game, see Dynkin (1969)) with incom-
plete information without a value.
The game is as follows: at the outset of the game a bit (0 or 1) b is chosen
randomly with some probability p > 0 to be 1 and probability 1 − p to be
0. the Maximizer is informed of the value of b but not the Minimizer. Then
the following game is played. At each odd stage the Maximizer may opt to
“stop” the game and the payoff is -1 if b = 0 and 1 if b = 1. At each even
stage the Minimizer may opt to “stop” the game and the payoff is -1 if b = 0
and some A > 1
p
if b = 1.
The payoff before and after someone decides to “stop” the game is zero.
This is a very simple stopping game with only one “unknown” parameter,
yet, as we now argue, it has no value.
Claim 5 The upper value of this game is p
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Proof. To see that val(G) ≤ p let the Minimizer’s strategy be to continue at
all stages. The Maximizer cannot gain more than p1 + (1 − p)0 = p against
this strategy, so the upper value cannot be higher than p.
On the other hand, let σ be a strategy for the Minimizer. It consists of
{σi}
∞
i=1 the probabilities of stopping at stage i and σ∞ = 1 −
∑∞
i=1 σi the
probability of never choosing “stop”.
Fix ǫ > 0 and let N be an odd integer such that
∑∞
i=N+1 σi < ǫ. Let τ be
the following strategy for the Maximizer: if b = 0 never stop, if b = 1 stop
at stage N . The payoff under < σ, τ > is:
p
N∑
i=1
σiA+ p(
∞∑
i=N+1
σi + σ∞)1 + (1− p)
∞∑
i=1
σi(−1) + (1− p)σ∞0
= p(
∞∑
i=1
σi + σ∞) +
N∑
i=1
σi(pA− 1) +
∞∑
i=N+1
σi(p− 1) ≥ p− ǫ
where the last inequality holds since pA− 1 > 0 and
∑∞
i=N+1 σi < ǫ.
Therefore val(G) ≥ p.
Claim 6 The lower value of this game is p− 1−p
A
.
Proof. Let the Maximizer play the following strategy: If b = 1 stop at
time 1 with probability 1 − 1−p
Ap
and continue otherwise. If the Minimizer
never decides to stop the payoff will be p(1− 1−p
Ap
)1 + (1− p)0 = p− 1−p
A
. If
the Minimizer decides to stop at any stage, the payoff will be p(1− 1−p
Ap
)1 +
p1−p
Ap
A+ (1− p)(−1) = p− 1−p
A
. Clearly any mix of these pure strategies will
also result in payoff of exactly p− 1−p
A
.
To see that the Maximizer cannot guarantee more assume to the contrary
that there exist a strategy σ for the Maximizer with val(σ) > p− 1−p
A
. This
strategy consists of the probabilities {σ0i }
∞
i=1 of stopping at stage i if b = 0,
and {σ1i }
∞
i=1 if b = 1.
By our assumption, the payoff against any strategy for the Minimizer
should be more than p− 1−p
A
. Let the Minimizer always choose to continue.
The expected payoff in that case is
p(
∞∑
i=1
σ1i )1 + (1− p)(
∞∑
i=1
σ0i )(−1) > p−
1− p
A
,
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which implies
∞∑
i=1
σ1i > 1−
1− p
Ap
.
Let N be sufficiently large such that
∑N
i=1 σ
1
i > 1 −
1−p
Ap
. Consider the
following strategy for the Minimizer: continue until stage N and then stop.
The payoff will be
p(
N∑
i=1
σ1i )1 + p(1−
N∑
i=1
σ1i )A + (1− p)(−1)
= p+ p(1−
N∑
i=1
σ1i )(A− 1) + (1− p)(−1)
< p + p
1− p
Ap
(A− 1) + p− 1 = p−
1− p
A
,
a contradiction.
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